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Fascists and Soldiers: Ambivalent Loyalties and Political Violence in Wartime Romania


Abstract
This article explores the relationship between fascist social movements and the state by investigating the involvement of members of the Legion of the Archangel Michael in the Romanian army during the Second World War. Legionaries served in the military even though belonging to the Legion was illegal and despite the fact that they had recently staged a coup against the country’s dictator, General Ion Antonescu. It argues that legionaries were able to successfully reconcile their loyalties because the state and the movement shared a number of core values. Serving either the general or the Legion was a way of fighting for the Romanian nation-state, and the military provided legionaries with a serendipitous opportunity to annihilate Jews during the war. Legionaries actively participated in mass violence against Jews and Roma, sometimes instigating pogroms and at other times at the command of their superior officers. 


Fascists throughout interwar Europe were outspoken in their rejection of the ruling establishments in their countries even when their governments were broadly supportive of nationalist policies. In Yugoslavia Ustaša activists went so far as to assassinate the king in order to get their demands heard more clearly.​[1]​ The Lapua movement staged an armed rebellion against the Finnish government in 1932, and Arrow Cross gangs challenged the legitimacy of the Hungarian state’s monopoloy on violence by carrying out vigilante “justice” in the form of arson, vandalism, and frequent attacks on Jews.​[2]​ In Romania, members of the Legion of the Archangel Michael frequently clashed with police and gendarmes during political campaigns, assassinated two Prime Ministers, and denounced both the king and the Orthodox Church as traitors to the nation.​[3]​ Fascist rejections of European governments were not unambiguous, however, and Juan Linz has commented that while “the various ‘antis’ of fascism served to define its identity in contrast to other parties ... for each rejection there was also an incorporation of elements of what they rejected.”​[4]​ Elaborating his own theory of fascism, Michael Mann has made the ostensibly contradictory argument that “fascists worshipped state power” while forming “bottom-up” movements aimed at “radically destabilizing” the existing order.​[5]​ How could fascists both worship the state and seek to undermine its authority at the same time? 
	Unlike anarchists, fascists did not reject the concept of the state itself, but rather the legitimacy of governments that claimed to be acting on behalf of the nation while actually serving their own interests. Fascists claimed that they, and not their rulers, had the nation’s best interests at heart. Rejecting democracy as a corrupt, ineffective, and hypocritical form of government, they equally despised authoritarian rulers whose cliques also enriched themselves at the expense of the common people. 

The Legion of the Archangel Michael
Romania’s most famous fascist movement, the Legion of the Archangel Michael, emerged in 1927 from a collection of earlier ultranationalist student movements that had rioted and agitated for excluding Jews from the universities for the past five years. Just as the antisemitic students claimed that the government was not protecting Romanian interests unless it limited Jewish access to tertiary education, so too the legionaries argued that the corrupt politicians in Bucharest were “traitors” because they tolerated Jewish involvement in finance, industry, and the press. 
Unable to convince successive governments to take the sort of antisemitic measures the legionaries wanted, in 1930 they established a paramilitary wing known as the Iron Guard whose members promised to suffer and die in their struggle against government forces who tried to prevent their frequent acts of violence and vandalism. Although their rhetoric was still strongly antisemitic, by the early 1930s a substantial proportion of legionary violence was directed against the authorities. “If I had just one bullet,” wrote the Legion’s founder, Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, “and in front of me stood an enemy and a traitor, I would shoot the traitor.”​[6]​ Nicolae Iorga’s government outlawed the Iron Guard in March 1932. In December 1933 legionaries assassinated the Prime Minister, Ion Gh. Duca. His successor arrested hundreds of legionaries, and the Legion’s anti-government rhetoric softened once Codreanu and his followers left prison the following year. In 1935 Codreanu described the Legion as a “spiritual” movement whose aim was to create a “new man” through suffering and sacrifice.​[7]​ Although the Legion limited its use of political violence between 1934 and 1938, legionary publications still advocated for the exclusion of Jews from Romania.​[8]​ Legionaries were implicated in small-scale incidents of antisemitic violence throughout the decade, with crimes including arson, vandalism, assault, and murder.​[9]​ Legionaries recruited heavily among students, workers, and peasants, and by 1937 the organization could boast 270,000 members, winning 15.58 percent of the votes in the national elections of 1937.​[10]​ 
King Carol II refused to allow the legionaries to form a government despite their electoral success, and instead appointed a cabinet led by two prominent antisemites, Octavian Goga and A. C.Cuza, who were long-time rivals of Codreanu. The new government immediately introduced harsh antisemitic laws, but it also moved against the Legion, leading to increased violence and high numbers of legionary casualties. Codreanu disbanded the Legion in February 1938, at a time when membership was at an unprecedented high. The king dissolved parliament soon after, establishing himself as a royal dictator and appointing the Patriarch of the Romanian Orthodox Church, Miron Cristea, as Prime Minister.  The new government continued introducing new antisemitic measures, and also persecuted legionaries throughout 1938 and 1939, executing Codreanu together with a number of his supporters. Most of the men and women who had led the Legion under Codreanu died during this repression, while a small group led by Horia Sima escaped to Germany.​[11]​
Legionaries continued to meet together after Codreanu’s death, but they did so in constant fear of the authorities and spent more time planning terrorist activities against the government than attacking Jews. Legionaries continued to assault Jews during this period, but usually in small-scale, isolated incidents.​[12]​ The situation changed dramatically for legionaries in September 1940, when Horia Sima took power in a coup together with General Ion Antonescu, calling their new regime the National Legionary State. Legionaries ruled alongside Anontescu for five months, before relations between them became so bad that the legionaries attempted to overthrow the general in an armed rebellion in January 1941. The general repressed the Legion harshly, arresting anyone who had taken part in the rebellion and effectively eliminating the movement as a political force. Most of the Legion’s leaders were in exile or in prison by June 1941, when the government began, in the words of its Minister of the Interior, Mihai Antonescu, “cleansing our people of all those elements foreign to its soil, which have grown like weeds to darken its future.”​[13]​ Ion Anontescu’s destruction of the Legion six months before Operation Barbarossa began means that legionaries have been associated with the Holocaust only as predecessors of the mass murder that took place under Anontescu’s leadership. Reflecting on the legionary contribution to the Holocaust, Radu Ioanid writes that,
The victims of the Legionnaire pogroms of January 1941 amounted to a numerically small portion of those against whom crimes were committed by the Romanian army and gendarmerie later. But mass murder represented an ideological victory for the Legionnaires and resulted in considerable part from long years of Legionnaire propaganda, the realization of Iron Guard dreams. The irony was that the Guard had been banned by the time most of the killing took place.​[14]​
Ioanid’s distinction between legionary violence and the genocidal violence of the Romanian army is consistently reflected in the scholarly literatures on fascism and on the Holocaust in Romania. A number of the book-length histories of the Legion usually end the story with Codreanu’s death in 1938, because after this point the movement changed from a grassroots social movement into an underground terrorist organization, then into a fascist dictatorship, and finally into a collection of illegal networks of fugitives hostile to the government.​[15]​ Histories of the Legion that do deal with the post-1938 period focus primarily on the movement’s leadership and largely ignore activists not explicitly carrying out legionary business.​[16]​ Historians of the Holocaust in Romania make similar distinctions regarding the role of legionaries in the Holocaust. Many of the major works on the subject begin with the mass killings of 1941, and those which do include legionary violence do so only when the killers claimed to be acting on behalf of the Legion.​[17]​ 
Both Antonescu and the Legion articulated antisemitic ideologies, both sought the expansion and strengthening of an ethnically Romanian nation-state, and both desired a military alliance with Nazi Germany. What changed after the rebellion of January 1941 is that one could no longer legally work towards these goals while publically identifying as a legionary. Anyone wishing to support Romanian nationalism now had to do so under the direction of the Romanian state. After losing power, not all former legionaries still living inside Romania abandoned the political goals they had been fighting for over the past decade. Many joined the army and continued fighting for these ends by other means. This article explores the military careers of prominent legionaries during the Second World War as a way of breaking down the dichotomy between state and social movement that is presumed in the literature. Fascists did oppose the state, but during the war they also served as bureaucrats and soldiers even though state employees were prohibited from affiliating with political parties.
Reconstructing the intersection between legionary activism and military service has recently been made possible by the opening of the archives of the Communist-era secret police (Securitate). Although some of the documents in these archives are organized into thematic collections, the vast majority exist as personal files used for criminal trials, for recording surveillance on specific individuals, or as records of an informant’s dealings with the Securitate. The file of the legionary Simion Lefter, for example, contains three volumes of trial records as well as eight volumes of surveillance, including records the Securitate inherited from its interwar predecessor, known as the Siguranţa. Lefter’s family had been involved in antisemitic activism since the mid-1920s, and an historian reading Lefter’s file can find court records and surveillance spanning from 1934 to 1989. The files record that Lefter was released from prison in October 1939 only to be incorported into the 15th Dorobanţi Regiment as part of a general mobilization and sent to Bacău for officer training. He left the army once the state of emergency had subsided and worked for the National Legionary State Romanianizing Jewish cinemas before being reincorporated into his regiment and sent to fight first in Transnistria then later in Czechoslovakia. The Siguranţa suspected Lefter of carrying out subversive legionary activities while he was under arms, but he was also promoted to the rank of Lieutenant and decorated for bravery several times.​[18]​ Careers such as Lefter’s suggest that one could be an activist and a loyal soldier at the same time, even though the Legion was officially illegal.
Much of the information in these files is repetitive and the Securitate relied on hearsay and confessions obtained under torture when other types of evidence were unavailable. Not all periods of an individual’s life are covered consistently, and there are significant chronological gaps in the information. These files cannot be taken at face value, and need to be read critically while cross-referencing information from other sources.​[19]​ Securitate files nonetheless allow researchers to reconstruct the basic outline of individual careers, which means that whereas earlier histories of the Legion discussed legionaries who were either imprisoned or exiled after January 1941, we can now show that some legionaries integrated themselves relatively seemlessly into the military and genocidal project of the Romanian state. 
What emerges from these archives is no longer the history of a movement but a collective biography of individuals who had been affiliated with the Legion for significant periods. This approach does not tell us why soliders killed, but it does reveal that some of them – a small minority – were known supporters of antisemitism, and moreover, that they had preexisting personal ties with the Legion that they brought into the army when they enlisted. Shifting our attention from states and movements to networks of individuals builds on recent developments within Holocaust studies that emphasize microhistories of violence and decision-making “from below.”​[20]​ Officers, from Antonescu down, gave orders for the annihilation of Jews and Roma, but it was ordinary soldiers who decided how the killing took place. Even though it is impossible to demonstrate whether or not soldiers with legionary connections influenced their peers during the Holocaust, the fact that they were present challenges the dichotomy that separates state and social movement actors and should motivate further research on the social and political backgrounds of “ordinary” perpetrators.

Codreanu’s Legionaries in the Military
Soldiers and gendarmes were not legally allowed to join political parties or to support extremist movements, but legionaries served in the army well before the Second World War broke out.​[21]​ Codreanu encouraged his followers to do their obligatory military service and to participate in pre-military training so that they could learn discipline and how to use guns.​[22]​ In 1935 the government introduced compulsory pre-military training for all high-school aged males. The goal was to “develop moral and national sentiments, to cultivate the spirit of order and discipline among the citizenry. Developing physical aptitude. ... Acquiring elementary military knowledge so as to assimilate military instruction more quickly and easily once [boys] are called up.”​[23]​ On Codreanu’s orders, legionaries attempted to become instructors of pre-military units, and the movement’s youth wing used pre-military training as opportunities for recruiting new members.​[24]​ Legionaries apparently saw no problem serving both the army and the movement, and they even praised the pre-military work camps in their publications.​[25]​
	All Romanian males were also expected to complete military service on reaching 21 years of age.​[26]​ Legionaries consistently told Siguranţa interrogators that they stopped doing legionary activities during military service, but several mentioned during interrogations that they had nonetheless met other legionaries while doing military service.​[27]​ Vasile Coman, a legionary activist from Luduş in Transylvania, was conscripted and sent to Galaţi to do compulsory military service in April 1934. In his memoirs, Coman says that he was persecuted by his commanding officers because he was a legionary, but that he did not react because he did not want to damage the “prestige” of the Legion. Coman kept in touch with changes in the movement by visiting legionaries whenever he had leave, and met other legionaries who were also doing military service.​[28]​
	The specter of legionaries in the army terrified military leaders. An investigation in the 36th Infantry Regiment in February 1934 identified only two legionaries, and another from December 1935 found only six legionaries in the 34th Infantry Regiment. A large-scale investigation began in April 1934, when police interviewed a schoolboy named Ştefan Oprea from Iaşi, who claimed to know about a plot by Lieutenant Colonel Precup to assassinate King Carol II. Oprea also implicated Tiberiu Rebreanu, a law student from Cluj who led an ultranationalist party known as Noi (We), and mentioned scores of other officers who were also apparently involved.​[29]​ Only Precup was convicted, but Oprea’s revelations and the subsequent trial caused the authorities to worry about fascist plots within the military.​[30]​ One police report mentioned “long conversations” between Codreanu and an army officer in 1936, and another claimed that large numbers of officers in civilian clothes were present at the Legion’s work camp at Carmen Sylva that year.​[31]​ Nothing came of either report. 
According to most accounts, there was a great deal of dissatisfaction within the military because the Romanian army was as poorly equipped in peace time as it had been during the First World War. Both officers and soldiers complained about lack of food and clothing.​[32]​ The government increased its military budget significantly from 1936 onwards, but weapons and equipment were still out of date and inadequate for a major war.​[33]​ In April 1936 Codreanu and General Cantacuzino-Grăncierul, a retired war hero who played a leading role in the Legion, talked about making it legionary policy to introduce a single uniform into the military when they took power, doing away with unnecessary regalia and ranks. They also proposed capping salaries of generals and engineers so as to have enough money to fund the rest of the army.​[34]​ Poor working conditions intensified the legionary message, and a number of army officers joined the movement as soon as they retired. Senior reserve officers including Colonel Ştefan Zavoianu and Colonel Lupaşcu were active in the Legion, and a series of retirements in 1937 caused legionaries to intensify their propaganda among retired military personnel.​[35]​ That December, Colonel Bolintineanu, Colonel Paul Cambureanu, General M. Ignat, Lieutenant Colonel M. Mamaliga, Colonel V. Pipescu, and General M. Racoviţa all ran in the national elections as candidates for Codreanu’s Everything for the Fatherland Party.​[36]​
The Siguranţa discovered a military plot against the king in 1938, involving the legionary Ion Roth and a large number of army officers. Officers interrogated Roth several times over the affair. They only managed to convict three people of complicity, but in his memoirs Roth claims that many more people were involved.​[37]​ One police report from December 1938 warned that “apparently most of the army, including young officers who command troops, are legionaries.”​[38]​ In 1938 Legionaries also began joining a voluntary organization known as the National Guard, which King Carol established to carry out work projects in a patriotic vein. Terrified that legionaries would use the National Guard for their own purposes, the government examined potential volunteers carefully lest it become another legionary recruiting ground.​[39]​
Legionaries were also active in the gendarmerie, which was run by the Defense Ministry. Gendarmes kept the peace in rural areas by investigating crimes, arresting suspects, and preventing disturbances.​[40]​ In 1936 a Colonel Ciurea was discovered running legionary propaganda courses, which he taught at the School for Gendarme Officers in Bucharest.​[41]​ Two years later, Captain Venat of the gendarmerie was arrested for sheltering three wanted legionaries.​[42]​ Like soldiers, gendarmes discovered to have legionary connections faced serious disciplinary action, so most were circumspect about showing their allegiances. 

The Regimes of General Ion Antonescu
The non-aggression pact signed between Hitler and Stalin in August 1939 exposed Romania to the territorial ambitions of its larger neighbors, and with no hope of defending its own claims, Romania ceded a third of its territory to Hungarian, Bulgarian and Soviet demands through the Treaty of Craiova (August 7, 1940) and the Second Vienna Award (August 30, 1940). Faced with the loss of these territories, King Carol II mobilized 1.2 million men in June 1940, only to order them to withdraw from the surrendered regions in a humiliating retreat.​[43]​ Romanian soldiers took out their frustration on local Jews and between June 30 and July 2 they tortured, killed, and dismembered scores of Jews in towns and villages in Bukovina and Bessarabia with the aid of ethnic Romanians from the area. Sometimes these killings were organized by officers with known legionary sympathies.​[44]​ 
On June 1, soldiers tortured, raped, and pillaged Jewish families in the town of Dorohoi. At least 200 people died during the massacre, including Jews in the army.​[45]​ According to Adrian Cioflâncă, the massacre was instigated by a former legionary named Gheorghe Butnărescu, and most of the perpetrators also had legionary sympathies.​[46]​ Testimonies of survivors show that there was miscommunication within the chain of command and that soldiers attacked Jews without always having orders to do so from their superiors.​[47]​ Some of the worst offenders were disorganized groups of soldiers who had stopped in Dorohoi on their way to join their units stationed elsewhere.​[48]​ Someone had obviously warned locals that a massacre was being planned, however, because Christians placed icons in their windows to alert soldiers not to attack their houses.​[49]​ Securitate archives show that some prominent legionaries served as enlisted soldiers during this mobilization, including Simion Toma, a school teacher who had been involved in the Legion since 1933 and spent several years in prison after an attempted assassination in 1936.​[50]​ Toma’s unit retreated through Bessarabia, where much of the killing took place.​[51]​ 
The loss of Transylavnia, Bessarabia, and Bukovina humiliated King Carol II’s regime, and on September 6, 1940, General Antonescu and Horia Sima forced the king to abdicate and established the National Legionary State. Senior government positions were filled by legionaries, including Sima as Deputy Prime Minister, and five other legionaries in ministerial posts. Antonescu tried to keep legionaries out of the military, arguing in November 1940 that “those who are in the army should stay there, and the same for those in [legionary] nests.”​[52]​ The military newspaper Sentinela (The Sentinel) announced the regime change with a message from Antonescu that “in this traumatizing moment for Romania, I have taken control of the state through the wisdom of his majesty the king.”​[53]​ No mention was made of the Legion. It took three weeks before the newspaper began printing legionary poetry, images, and eulogies, and even while it praised the Legion it made no effort to convince soldiers to join the movement.​[54]​ A few weeks later, the journalist Aurel Cosmoiu made the relationship clear in an article entitled “The Army and the Legion.” He said that Antonescu promised to organize military education along “the same lines as Corneliu Codreanu,” but this did not mean that the two organizations were to intermingle.​[55]​
Now that legionaries had legal backing for their cruelty, antisemitic violence became a trademark of the National Legionary State. Legionaries arrested and tortured Jews in eastern Romanian cities in September 1940, and they massacred inmates of the Jilava prison in November. Legionaries often mutilated the bodies of their victims, and led actions to expropriate Jewish property and to expel Jews from the towns as well as beating, torturing, and murdering Jews at random.​[56]​ Antonescu and Sima could not cooperate for long, however, and Antonescu dismissed several prominent legionaries from key posts on January 19, 1941. The legionaries responded by launching a rebellion three days later, during which they also attacked Jews in Bucharest, killing 120 people and torturing many more. The revolt was put down with tanks, and Sima fled the country together with other prominent legionaries.​[57]​ Several military units stationed in provincial cities supported the rebellion, but confusion was rife in the chains of command and it is possible that these units misunderstood who their superiors were.​[58]​ Antonescu repeatedly emphasized his gratitude towards the military for supporting him during the rebellion, and claimed that he, not Sima’s followers, were Codreanu’s true heirs.​[59]​
Police arrested over 2,000 rebels within ten days of the rebellion, and widespread arrests and extensive trials took place in the following month.​[60]​ Horia Sima fled to Germany together with his closest followers. Roughly 15,000 legionaries were in prison in June 1941, and by August 11,830 people had faced trial for participating in the rebellion, of whom only 6,543 were condemned.​[61]​ This was a tiny fraction of those who had identified as legionaries under the National Legionary State. Others were convicted but had their sentences suspended indefinitely.​[62]​ Of the seventy-three people charged with rebellion in the town of Târgu-Neamţ, for example, only eight were convicted and they only served two months each.​[63]​ Large number of legionaries therefore remained at large after the rebellion, and when rumors spread that Horia Sima would return and was calling legionaries from the provinces to the capital on February 24, 1941, police expected between 50,000 and 70,000 people to descend on Bucharest.​[64]​ 
Antonescu’s treatment of legionaries was ambivalent throughout the rest of his rule. Although officially he maintained a policy of zero tolerance towards any legionary activism, in reality legionaries were able to move around freely and clandestine legionary organizing now took place more quietly, but continued unabated. Extremist periodicals that had published legionary propaganda, such as Porunca vremii (The Command of the Times) and Sfarmă Piatră (Rock-Cruncher), continued publication with few changes throughout Antonescu’s time in office, the latter being run by Alexandru Gregorian, who had helped establish the cuzist youth leagues in 1931.​[65]​ Respected antisemities such as Ion Sângiorgiu, a university professor who had supported Cuza and Goga’s antisemitic government before 1940 but who became a staunch legionary in September 1940, continued publishing antisemitic newspapers under Antonescu. Sângiorgiu publically supported Antonescu while using his connections to provide jobs, visas, and information for discredited legionaries.​[66]​
Legionaries quarelled among themselves, held meetings, collected money for their friends in prison, planned to assassinate Antonescu, and continued trying to establish new periodicals.​[67]​ Not only were many former legionaries out of prison and eligible for military service when Operation Barbarossa began in June 1941, but some of them still identified with the Legion. Ion Găvănescu petitioned General Antonescu as soon as the war began, asking that legionaries be given the “honor” of being conscripted into the forces fighting at the front. Antonescu replied that “legionaries will fight in the same ranks and the same conditions in which all Romanian citizens are called to fight,” implying that no distinction would be made according to political affiliations.​[68]​ Few of Antonescu’s senior officials had been affiliated with the Legion in the past, but the general assured his German allies in the wake of the rebellion that “the government would naturally be guided by the positive ideas that the healthy element of the Legionnaires wished to see prevail.”​[69]​ Police reports from June 1941 mention that “moderate legionaries” were now willing to throw their support behind Antonescu because if Hitler trusted him, so should they.​[70]​

The Iaşi Pogrom
Legionary involvement in the pogrom in Iaşi in June-July 1941 demonstrates exactly how inadequately the Legion had been repressed. Soon after the war with the Soviet Union began, thousands of Jews were massacred in the streets of Iaşi or died in “death trains” as they were deported from the city.​[71]​ The area was under the control of German military commanders, although post-war testimonies suggest that the initial massacres were organized by agents of the Romanian Secret Service (SSI) and carried out by former legionaries. A police report from July 27, 1941, stated that in Iaşi “only a few of the legionary rebels have remained, ... [they] inflamed the population against the Jews, urging them to plunder [Jewish property] and we suspect that these elements are among those who sympathized with the legionary movement.”​[72]​
 	The first victims of the pogrom were killed by Mircea Manoliu, a sergeant in the 13th Dorobanţi Regiment, and Corporal Ştefan Nicolau. On June 26, 1941, Manoliu received orders to guard three Jews, but instead took them into a nearby valley where he shot them. The following evening he and Nicolau shot another five Jews they had been ordered to guard. Both Manoliu and Nicolau were Romanian soldiers, but Manoliu had been a member of the Legion since 1936, and Nicolau may also have had a legionary past.​[73]​ In a declaration from 1950, Manoliu stated that “as I was raised in that antisemitic spirit which poisoned most young people my age ... the idea that I should accomplish a mission developed easily in me (I thought like this at the time, thanks to the militaristic and antisemitic instruction and education that I received during my three years in the army).”​[74]​ The fact that Manoliu attributed his antisemitic education to the army and not to the Legion does not mean that he had not been an antisemite before joining the military, but that the Romanian army was already an antisemitic organization before reservists with legionary pasts flooded its ranks. Photographs of the Iaşi pogrom frequently portray Romanian soldiers as perpetrators alongside gendarmes, premilitary cadets, and unidentified locals.​[75]​
Local legionaries were also involved, and may have been responsible for marking Christian houses with crosses a few days before the pogrom.​[76]​ A SSI agent named Constantin Mihalcea testified in 1945 that “legionary elements carried out acts of sabotage, cutting [electrical] wires and throwing grenades during the [Soviet] bombardment [of June 26].”  Fritz Gebhard Schellborn, the German consul in Iaşi, later wrote that while German soldiers were recovering the bodies of those killed in the bombing, some “Romanians, most wearing the cuzist swastica, were trying to instigate the German soldiers against the Jews.”​[77]​ As Schellborn was obviously aware, the swastica identified supporters of A. C. Cuza as well as legionaries, but the fact that these individuals were wearing it clearly identified them as people with a history of antisemitic activism. Gheorghe Leahu, the adjunct police chief, reported that Mr. Venturică, who had been the county’s legionary prefect under the National Legionary State, “was in his car in front of houses in the neighborhood where the first attacks on Jews took place on June 26 by legionaries and soldiers of the 13th Dorobanţi and 24th Artillery,” and that another legionary, Horia Hulubei, “was in contact with the German military and the German consulate in Iaşi.”​[78]​
	After soldiers searched Jewish homes in Iaşi the following day, two SSI officers armed and organized legionaries to massacre Jews.​[79]​ Colonel Constantin Lupu, who was in command of the garrison, stated that,
On 27 June 1941, immediately after the bombardment, Col. Chirilovici telephoned me that a group of legionaries had gathered in the Păcurari neighborhood, where they were singing legionary songs and alarming the population. ... I found a group of roughly 30-40 legionaries, all armed and starting to spread out with their guns. I found two crates of weapons in the pavilion where they had gathered. Two men presented themselves and told me that they were officers sent from the General Command of the Secret Service to arm legionaries who would then be sent behind enemy lines.​[80]​
Jean Ancel notes that the legionaries were seen with automatic pistols that most likely came from military or police stores.​[81]​ Braunstein, a leader of the Jewish community in Iaşi, later testified that on June 28, Jews were gunned down by a machine gun that “had been placed in the hotel attic by some Iron Guard soldiers who were guarding Tax Collection Office No. 1.”​[82]​ None of these accounts suggest that former legionaries were single-handedly responsible for the Iaşi pogrom. What they do show is that contemporaries believed that former legionaries were at large, were still able to identify and behave as legionaries, and were sufficiently antisemitic that they would initiate the mass murder of Jews.

Bessarabia and Bukovina
General Antonescu reorganized the army when he came to power in September 1940, and mobilized a force of 1.1 million men in July 1941, of whom roughly 325,000 crossed the Prut River into the Soviet Union with the objective of conquering Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina.​[83]​ The operation took 24 days, and the Romanian army sustained heavy losses.​[84]​ As they moved east, Romanian soldiers, gendarmes, and local supporters assembled and massacred Jews in one village after another.​[85]​ Einsatzgruppen commanders complained that Romanian soldiers vandalized, looted, and set fire to Jewish houses without thinking about how they would clean up the mess afterwards. They described the soldiers as “undisciplined” and in Bălţi the Germans prevented a massacre by the Romanians on the grounds that “the technical preparations for executing their plans were inadequate.”​[86]​ When the 6th Vânători regiment arrived at Sculeni, a village 17 miles north of Iaşi, Captian Ion Stihi and Second Lieutenant Eugen Mihailescu, both former legionaries, organized soldiers to murder every Jew in the area. Their orders came from the regimental commander, Colonel Matieş Ermil, and they collaborated with locals who had supported A. C. Cuza before the war.​[87]​ Gheorghe Cimpoieş, a former legionary who had been mayor of Sculeni during the National Legionary State, now served in the 27th Artillery Regiment and he received leave to participate in the killing. With the support of other soldiers, these men identified and executed 311 Jewish men, women, and children from the Sculeni area.​[88]​
	The massacre at Sculeni was only one of hundreds carried out by the Romanian army in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, and it was not only units containing former legionaries that carried out the killing.  In 1951 investigators interrogated 43 soldiers of the 7th Roşiori Regiment who were involved in executing Jews in June 1941, for example, and only one of them had any prior political affiliations – he had belonged to the National Peasant Party.​[89]​ A similar investigation into massacres at Ciudeni and Storojineţ that summer also found no legionaries present.​[90]​ 
Legionaries were not present either in the 7th Roşiori Regiment or at Ciudeni and Storojineţ, but they were involved in other massacres, albeit not necessarily as instigators. Avigdor Shachan argues that “almost every single unit of the Romanian army which made its way to the front took part in the murder and torture.”​[91]​ A number of former legionaries from a variety of social backgrounds were amongst the rank and file soldiers in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. Gheorghe Grecu joined the Legion in 1928, at fifteen years of age, and was involved in numerous legionary propaganda exercises, work camps, and battles, including the rebellion of January 1941. He nonetheless avoided prison and was with the army in the eastern territories.​[92]​ Ioan Moloaca, a factory worker who had been appointed mayor of his village during the National Legionary State, joined the 41st Artillery Battalion and took part in the invasion.​[93]​ The lawyer Gheorghe Policala, who had joined the Legion in 1931, became a platoon leader in the 9th Roşiori Regiment from August 8, 1941 onwards.​[94]​ A peasant activist named Ion Tâmbăluță, who had been in the Legion since 1937, fought with the 13th Calvalry Regiment.​[95]​ Other former legionary activists whose presence in the army in Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina can be documented included Virgil Apostolescu, Nicolae Manolescu, Simion Lefter, Simion Toma, Codreanu’s brother, Decebal Zelea Codreanu, and Laurenţiu Voicu, who served as his Battalion’s medical officer.​[96]​
The military was a relatively safe place for men whose reputations had been sullied by their affiliation with the Legion and the urgency of the mobilization prevented too many questions being asked about their pasts. Unlike the problems faced soldiers who were ethnic Roma or who were affiliated with pacifist religious groups such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses, mass murder of Jews and Roma was not an issue for former legionaries, who had either endorsed or perpetrated acts of violence against Jews long before they joined the army. 
	
Transnistria
Romanian war aims changed after the military conquered Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. No longer fighting for territory Romanians considered “rightfully theirs,” the soldiers sought to consolidate their gains by defeating the Soviet Union as part of Operation Barbarossa. Antonescu and his advisors hoped that not only would defeating Stalin prevent him reclaiming the conquered territories, committing Romanian troops might persuade Hitler to restore Northern Transylvania to Romanian sovereignty.​[97]​ As his armies advanced, Antonescu reorganized the region between the Dniester and Bug Rivers as an occupied territory, calling it Transnistria. He appointed thirteen military governors known as pretors to administer individual counties, with gendarme and police units responsible for enforcing Romanian authority.​[98]​ Romanian soldiers devastated Transnistrian villages just as they had done in Bessarabia and Bukovina. On Antonescu’s orders, they also deported the surviving Jews from Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to Transnistria. 
The Romanian Fourth army reached Odessa in early August 1941 and conquered the city 73 days later.​[99]​  Exacerbated by their heavy losses, soldiers began raping, looting and killing from the moment they entered the city. In October the Romanian military headquarters exploded, killing 61 people including the highest ranking Romanian officer in the city, General Ioan Glogojanu. Antonescu responded by ordering the immediate murder of hundreds of Jews and Communists.​[100]​ Jean Ancel estimates that Romanian soldiers killed at least 30,000 Jews in Odessa between October 1941 and mid-March 1942, while deporting another 65,000.​[101]​ Tens of thousands more died in massacres at Bogdanovka, Akhmetchetka and Domanevka, among other places, or perished slowly in Transnistria’s concentration camps.​[102]​ A number of men with legionary pasts either fought at the siege of Odessa or helped occupy the city.​[103]​ The archives say nothing about whether or not they were involved in atrocities, the one exception being Possa Constantin Popescu, an actor who had joined the Legion in 1937. His Securitate file notes that “he killed many people” while serving as a pilot at the front.​[104]​ General Antonescu was directly responsible for the annihilation of Jews and Roma in Transnistria, but the presence of legionaries there makes it difficult to separate the history of the Legion from that of the Holocaust.
Former legionaries continued to play an active role in the army after it crossed into Transnistria, and one police informant reported that “legionaries are trying to recruit new elements, particularly within the military and among bureaucrats at public and private institutions.”​[105]​ Newspaper inspectors who travelled from Bucharest to Odessa told the police that there were approximately 800 legionaries in Transnistria in March 1943, while a gendarmerie report the following month guessed that there were only 235.​[106]​ The most prominent among them was Traian Herseni, a sociologist who joined the Legion in 1936 and wrote a number of popular legionary pamphlets. Antonescu put him in charge of the regime’s Cultural Department in Transnistria, and he in turn appointed other legionaries to positions of responsibility. Thanks to Herseni’s influence, Axente Sever Popovici, a young journalist who had written legionary propaganda under Nae Ionescu’s patronage, became head of the Literary Service in the Subdirectory of Culture, and he named a number of other legionaries to important bureaucratic posts in the region. Other former antisemites who had not been legionaries in the past also joined Herseni’s circle and supported their “legionary” clientelism.  Police believed that Herseni’s circle continued legionary activities in Transnistria, funelling money and information back to their comrades in Romania.​[107]​
	Legionary involvement in the Transnistrian administration was not limited to Herseni’s circle, and included Gheorghe Moţica, the commander of the Tiraspol airport,​[108]​ an engineer named Vlad who ran the Transnistrian warehouses in Bucharest,​[109]​ and Mircea Dutescu, a lawyer whose connections from his time spent running legionary newspapers secured him a license to sell Romanian newspapers in Odessa.​[110]​ When typhoid fever broke out in Transnistria, killing tens of thousands of Jews, the former legionary eugenicist Iordache Făcăoaru was in the province carrying out “bioanthropometric measurements of Romanians.” Together with other Romanian doctors in the area, he did little or nothing to relieve the epidemic, which quickly reached genocidal proportions.​[111]​ Finally, the Romanian Orthodox Church used the opportunity to reestablish its presence in a region that had been dominated by the Russian Church, and hundreds of priests and cantors entered the region together with the soldiers, setting up almost three hundred churches within a year.​[112]​ The Romanian patriarch made it a criminal offense to baptize Jews in Transnistria, and the missionary priests turned a blind eye to the mass killings going on around them.​[113]​ Visarion Puiu, a church leader whose legionary sympathies were well-known, was appointed Metropolitan of Transnistria, and Archimandrite Antim Nică, a monk who had written a treatise for reorganizing the church under legionary principles, oversaw the organization of missionary activities.​[114]​ Father Ion Burlanescu, who had been an active supporter first of A. C. Cuza and then of the Legion, went to Transnistria as a missionary priest and travelled frequently between Odessa and Bucharest, bringing stolen goods back into Romania, including a large collection of guitars and mandolins which he still had in his possession in August 1944.​[115]​ In addition to the opportunities for personal gain that Transnistria offered, many priests had been highly visible supporters of the Legion, and relocating to Transnistria was an effective way to avoid accusations of legionary activities from their parishioners. 

Beyond Odessa
While the Fourth Army was fighting at Odessa, the Third Army supported the German Eleventh Army in its campaigns further north before being deployed to defend the coasts on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov and to garrison Transnistria while VII Corps was diverted to supported the German campaign in the Crimea.​[116]​ The legionary Şerban Milcoveanu describes the murder of Jews in Crimea in his memoirs of this campaign, but denies that Romanian or German soldiers took part in it.​[117]​ A new offensive began in July 1942 aimed at conquering Stalingrad. The Fourth Army in particular was almost completely reorganized in summer 1942, and both the Third and Fourth Armies suffered such heavy losses at Stalingrad in December 1942 that they were effectively destroyed as military units.​[118]​ The surviving Romanian units fought rear-guard actions as Axis troops slowly retreated from the Caucasus and the Crimea during 1943. Antonescu agreed to allow selected orphans to return from Transnistria in Novmber 1943, but the majority of Jews there continued to die in large numbers until the Soviets reconquered the territory in April 1944.​[119]​
	Legionaries continued to join the Romanian army well after the conquest of Odessa.​[120]​ One secret police report from July 1942 reported a rumor that “a Romanian battalion entered Sevastopol singing [the legionary hymn] “Holy Legionary Youth,” at a time when the units fighting in the Don region are under the influence of legionaries sent to the front.”​[121]​ Legionaries were not always welcome in the army, however. Romanian officers frequently verbally and physically abused enlisted men, especially those who were ethnically or politically different, and legionaries are likely to have been particular targets for bullying.​[122]​ Şerban Milcoveanu records being singled out by Major Gheorghe Ionescu in Crimea, who harranged him in front of 800 soldiers as a legionary and as a threat to the whole army.​[123]​ In December 1943 a young conscript named Rucăreanu shot himself on the parade ground in Bucharest after the regiment’s captain persecuted him for his legionary affiliations.​[124]​
	As Romanian military losses mounted, Antonescu began releasing imprisoned legionaries on the condition that they fight on the Eastern Front. Legionary memoirs claim that imprisoned legionaries had been requesting the opportunity to fight ever since the invasion began, but to little effect.​[125]​ Antonescu’s intransigence faltered when thirteen legionaries staged a hunger strike in Ocnele Mari Prison on March 12, 1942, demanding that they be allowed to fight.​[126]​ Antonescu responded on April 2 with an announcement that,
At their request, many political prisoners have been sent to the front for rehabilitation. The units at the front, however, have requested that they not be mixed with compromised elements known for criminal behavior and disorderly conduct. In light of this very reasonable reaction, those who wish to rehabilitate themselves by serving the country at the front will be organized into special units and after rehabilitation will be sent to the units they wish to join.​[127]​
The army established Instruction Center No. 5 later that month at Sărata, in Chilia County, as a training center for politically compromised recruits. After training, the new battalions were sent to the front in late 1942, where they fought at the Battle of Stalingrad.​[128]​ Not all legionaries were willing to enlist, and those who would not volunteer spent the rest of the war in prison.​[129]​ Şerban Milcoveanu, a legionary who passed through Instruction Center No. 5, claimed in his memoirs that these were “suicide battalions” that were consistently given the most deadly assignments and were forced to walk through minefields to find unexploded mines.​[130]​ Milcoveanu’s story has retold by a number of pro-legionary authors, but there is no other evidence that this was the case and Dorin Dobrincu’s evaluation of Milcoveanu’s claim that “tens of thousands” of legionaries died at the front as a “fantasy” is most likely correct.​[131]​ The experiences of Romanian soldiers at Stalingrad were severe regardless of their political backgrounds. Romanian commanders were well-known for ignoring the basic needs of their troops, and frequently sent them into battle immediately after long marches or in other conditions likely to result in high casualties.​[132]​ Roughly 140,000 Romanian soldies were killed, wounded, or missing during this campaign, and it is incredible that anyone survived, regardless of their political pasts.​[133]​ 

Conclusion
The Romanian army and bureaucracy recruited legionaries during the Second World War because states need functionaries and armies need soldiers. By 1942 military losses had become so extreme that Antonescu was even willing to recruit soldiers directly from the prisons. Former activists could thus hope to erase the stain of their association with the Legion by serving in the military, and years later many cited honors they had received while under arms as evidence that they were loyal Romanians and should not be considered suspect just because of old political allegiances. 
From the perspective of the legionaries, the opportunity for military service was serendipitous because the army emphasized the same virtues that the movement did – loyalty to the nation, physical fitness, violence, and antisemitism. It also provided opportunities for them to learn military strategies and weapons training. As their involvement in the military shows, legionaries were able to work within state structures to achieve their aims. Legionaries did not necessarily join the army because they saw in it the opportunity to become ethnic cleansers – in fact most had no choice about reporting for military duty – but neither did they attempt to undermine military discipline or the general’s war effort. Emphasizing the conflict between the state and the Legion disguises the fact that whether one served as a legionary or as a soldier, one was fighting for the nation nonetheless.
Romanian soldiers did not need legionaries to convince them to become mass murderers, though legionaries probably played some role in instigating pogroms at Dorohoi, Iaşi, Sculeni, and elsewhere. The involvement of legionaries in the Holocaust helps explain why certain individuals and units participated in the killing, but it is not an explanation for Romanian involvement in the Holocaust as a whole.  Historians remind us that Romanian soldiers were remarkably “willing executioners,” who raped and murdered indiscriminately and frequently killed without needing official orders to do so. According to Heinen, “the Romanian soldiers knew what they wanted and what they were doing.”​[134]​ They were not simply following orders, but were active participants in their own rights. 
	Identifying former legionaries as Holocaust perpetrators also adds an urgent corrective to the myth that the Legion was primarily a “spiritual” movement that embodied traditional Romanian virtues. Histories which emphasize a break in the movement’s history before and after Codreanu’s death in 1938 and again after the rebellion in 1941 naturally downplay legionary involvement in the Romanian Holocaust. By identifying the “true” Legion with its religious rhetoric, some pro-fascist writers have even claimed that the post-1938 violence in which legionaries were involved was simply a hoax, because legionaries would never have done such things.​[135]​ Just as Antonescu originally attempted to whitewash the Iaşi pogrom by identifying a handful of legionaries as perpetrators, more recently pro-fascist historians have minimized legionary guilt by blaming the Holocaust entirely on Hitler and Antonescu.​[136]​ The majority of perpetrators of the Romanian Holocaust were not legionaries, and many were not even soldiers. But the fact that former legionaries participated in, and occasionally initiated, violence against Jews in Iaşi, Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina, and throughout Transnistria, reminds us that the story of the Legion cannot be separated from that of the murder of between 280,000 and 380,000 Jews.
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